
Abstract

Borders now seem to be everywhere, just like it is often said in heritage studies that the past is everywhere. In this edited volume a multidisciplinary group of scholars explore what happens, philosophically and in practice, when these two concepts and phenomena, heritage and borders, are combined. The findings show that heritage, as well as borders, exist just as much in the mind as on the ground. Heritage and borders can be understood both in terms of roots and routes. They are matters of administration, but they are also matters of consideration, matters of competition, and matters of contention. They are defended in the name of security and protection, longing for belonging, and good will. And they are contested in the name of philosophical critique, or political and artistic activism. In six articles and a joint conversation, the volume addresses key issues and entangled complexities in discussions on heritage and borders that take place in and across academic disciplines today.

Keywords: Heritage, border, in-between, roots, routes, law, time, memory, buffer zone, conflict
Europe starts here!

On a bare promontory at the south-westernmost corner of Europe stands Sagres Fortress, one of the most famous and visited heritage sites in the Algarve region of Portugal (Fig. 1). Once the residence of Prince Henry the Navigator and, according to legend, the place of his 15th-century school of navigation, the site has come to signify early European overseas exploration. About 2,300 kilometres to the east, wedged in between two hillsides so as to resemble a prehistoric cave, lies Krapina Neanderthal Museum. Located next to the famous Croatian site of Hušnjakovo Hill, where the largest find of Neanderthal fossil bones in Central Europe was uncovered in 1899, the museum is dedicated to the culture, environment, and evolution of early humans. In 2015, these temporally and culturally remote sites were connected as they received the European Heritage Label (EHL).

Adopted by the EU in 2011,¹ the EHL is a recognition awarded to heritage sites on the merits of their “symbolic European value” and “role in the history and culture of Europe and/or the building of the Union”.² Upon being listed, sites are designated as places where Europe starts, henceforth bound to Europeanize their exhibitions and activities in order to strengthen European citizens’ sense of belonging to the EU.³

Using the sites in Sagres and Krapina as starting points, this chapter asks: what borders of belonging does heritage make and break in the name of Europe? In my investigation I first move inward to the centre of EU bureaucracy in Brussels, where an intentional lack of precision regarding the nature of Europe has created a bor-

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1 The EHL was first founded as an intergovernmental initiative in 2006 (Lähdesmäki 2014). When the EU took over in 2011, no previously labelled sites were transferred to the new scheme.
2 EU 2015.
3 EU 2018; EU 2011.
derland in EU cultural policy, vacillating between the parallel ideas of Europe as a unique civilization and Europe as a political community. This ambiguity, I propose, has produced a positively charged image of Europe in EU heritage actions. Moving backwards to the times presented as European at the EHL sites, I argue that this image resonates with the EHL’s adherence to a certain canon of European civilization and tends to disassociate the EU from dark and uncomfortable pasts. Finally, moving outward to the periphery and beyond the European continent, I use one feature at Sagres Fortress to illustrate how the border-transcending and civilization-confirming aspects of the EHL are linked to the parallel political project of externalizing the EU’s border regime. I also highlight how the latter empowers the European radical right – a political family which likewise relies on the canonized idea of European civilization.

Where do you belong?

Heritage and borders are not, borrowing the words of Ian Hacking, “obedient to our minds”. They are classes for which our ideas and that which they represent develop in symbiosis. No natural similarities can be found among, say, sites on the World
Heritage List, or national borders, aside from the manifestations created as a result of our classification: plaques and visitor centres, maps and barbed wired fences. Heritage and borders therefore demand constant reaffirmation and physical demarcation to continue to be recognized as such (see Hughes-Tidlund, this volume).

This understanding of heritage, as something we “do” rather than something that just exists, is now commonplace in Heritage Studies. It also resonates with approaches to borders in the field of Border Studies. As argued by Henk van Houtum, a border is a verb, and “[m]aking a border, demarcating a line in space is a collaborative act”. Adopting such a stance is to recognize that, rather than mirrors to the past or natural divisions of space, heritage and borders are world-making acts leaving their own imprint on reality. It also means that, as researchers and citizens, we always, in some capacity, participate in the production of heritage and borders. The next step would then be, as suggested by Tim Winter in relation to the future of Heritage Studies, to begin “focusing on the critical issues that face the world today, the larger issues that bear upon and extend outwards from heritage”. One such issue, in which heritage and borders converge, is the configuration of the conditions for belonging in present-day Europe.

A border is a question, van Houtum writes. The same is true for heritage. In their instrumentalized forms, they ask and answer one of the most dangerous questions of our time: Where do you belong? Depending on who is asking, what answer is given, and which arguments are used – passport, physical appearance, religious affiliation, cultural heritage – it can affect the trajectories of human lives. The power asymmetry embedded in this question, of who has the right to ask and the interpretative privilege to sanction certain responses over others, is what makes the EU’s search for a European identity embodied in heritage on the one hand, and hardening external borders on the other, so volatile. In what follows, I explore the intersection of European heritage and borders by drawing on insights gained through ethnographic fieldwork at EHL sites, participant observation in the European Commission, document analysis, and interviews.

5 Smith 2006.
6 van Houtum 2011, p. 60.
7 Winter 2013, p. 533.
8 I use the notion of belonging not as an individual assertion, but as something shaped through (and prescribed by) the interaction between politics and society, with bearing on collective identity formation and citizenship rights (for a discussion on uses of “belonging”, see Lähdesmäki et al. 2016).
9 van Houtum 2011, p. 60.
10 See also Niklasson 2016.
Extending inwards:
Borderlands of EU cultural policy

In late August 2017, at a bustling café in Zagreb, Croatia, I met with two persons involved in the promotion and nomination of EHL sites at national level. They were translators in a sense, recruited to locate suitable sites, such as Krapina Neanderthal Museum, and to explain the EU initiative to aspiring applicants. This is not an easy task, I was told, partly because there is no money to be gained by being awarded the label, just prestige, but also because the European Commission criteria were difficult to understand. They all sounded very similar and vague, asking for the site’s “European symbolic value”, “pan-European nature”, significance for European integration and history, how it endorses “common values”, and the “European dimension” of site activities. Having just joined the EU in 2013, the same year as the first EHL sites were awarded, the Croatian representatives had limited experience interpreting such identity-political EU expressions.

The Croatian representatives were not alone in their confusion. In each report presented by the “EHL expert panel” – the jury of specialists nominated by the EU to make the final assessment – it is stated that many applicants misunderstand the intentions of the EHL: that their narratives are not European enough, their explanations of the European dimension not intricate enough (or too anachronistic), and their links to European values not specific enough. These concerns echo issues raised in older EU heritage actions. The European Community’s first heritage scheme, offering partial financial support for monuments and sites of “European renown” (from 1983 to the mid-1990s), attracted many applications that, according to the Commission, “failed to satisfy the terms and conditions of the scheme”. It also resonates with my experiences working for the EU agency in charge of the funding programme Culture 2007–2013, where I processed hundreds of applications and helped monitor the expert panels. When it came to heritage, the first evaluation criterion, “European [cultural] added value”, was interpreted differently both between experts and applicants, with meanings ranging from Christianity to geographical location.

The root of this uncertainty, I argue, lies not in the EU’s definition of heritage (which follows those of UNESCO and Council of Europe) or poor application guidelines, but in its vague approach to “Europe” as a signifier. What should

11 EU 2015.
13 EU 1992a, p. 6 annex.
14 Niklasson 2016.
be achieved by the EU (integration and economic prosperity), and based on what principles (democracy, freedom, human rights), has been clear from the outset, but *Europe* and what it means to be *European* remains obscure. As highlighted by Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, this avoidance is not so much an outcome of neglect as a strategy.\(^{15}\) In the *Schuman Declaration* (1950), the first proposal for a European coal and steel community, Europe was used as a moral concept and almost magical formula. Only by conflating geographical and cultural Europe with the new co-operation was a wider integration project made possible. This especially visible in documents relating to EU enlargement:

> The term European has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity ... The Commission believes that it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union.\(^{16}\)

This ambiguity has shaped EU cultural policy, tasked with developing a European cultural area and “bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”.\(^{17}\) Most of all the interchangeable use of *Europe* and *the EU* has stimulated a celebratory view of European heritage. Wrapped up in the name of the political project, “Europe” was preordained to become a positive signifier, and heritage, a nostalgic project of late modernity, already implying something good – something worth saving.\(^{18}\) Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire figure frequently as reference points for democracy, citizenship, and the rule of law in EU rhetoric, and are thus symbolically tied to the EU institutions. When it comes to “negative” or “dark” heritage,\(^{19}\) such as the Holocaust and communist repression, these ties are severed. While vital to the self-narrative of the EU, and supported through many EU actions, sites from these periods are not used to tell a story of the contemporary Europe of the EU, but *the ashes from which it arose*. By presenting the Union as the saviour of a continent gone astray and promoting dark heritage as places of remembrance – brutal violence, racism, and tyranny become the stuff of moral tales, not internalized as part of what it means to be European.\(^{20}\)

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15 Puntscher Riekmann 1997, p. 64.
16 EU 1992b, p. 11.
17 EU 1992c.
18 Lowenthal 1998.
19 Meskell 2009.
This tendency to disentangle the Europe of the EU from uncomfortable pasts is reflected in the European Commission’s tentative division of EHL sites into four positive themes. Listed under the banner of “freedom and democracy”, the themes are: “struggle for peace”, “path to unity”, “quest for knowledge”, and “vanguards of progress”. Sites are then placed under one of these themes. In this exercise, the Roman archaeological military site of Carnuntum in Austria is placed under “vanguards of progress”, whereas Camp Westerbork, a Nazi transit camp in the Netherlands, is placed under “struggle for peace”. For Carnuntum, the EHL panel report refers to the Roman Empire as a “predecessor of Europe”, while it links the Nazi camp to values such as “reconciliation” and “European memories”. Perhaps the unwillingness to recognize negative heritage as symbolically linked to present-day Europe is why the staff at Camp Westerbork felt so uneasy when they received the standardized promotional EHL postcards, featuring the slogan “Europe starts here!” with the barracks where Jews were detained in the background. But is it really that far-fetched, historically speaking, to present Europe as starting with genocide?

The strategy of vagueness, whereby the frame of Europe is decided but not its content, has produced a conceptual borderland in EU cultural politics that stretches from 19th-century tropes of a unique European civilization, to present-day notions of cultural solidarity. The former view dominated the EU’s first heritage actions. Tacitly grounded in Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian heritage, it saw monuments and sites as silent witnesses of European history, and European identity as reflected in Western archaeological features and architectural styles. After the EU expanded eastwards in the 2000s, this view became less viable. Focus shifted from “European roots” to “European values” and from a European past embodied in things to a Europe embodied in people. Accordingly, the EU’s method for supporting heritage projects shifted from a target-oriented to a form-oriented approach. Instead of contributing to the restoration and conservation of flagship sites like the Athenian Acropolis, funding was increasingly directed towards cultural co-operation and European professional networks.

21 EU 2017.
22 EHL 2013, p. 8.
25 Delanty 2013.
27 Innocenti 2015.
In the EHL, both approaches meet. The EHL scheme is target-oriented, with sites envisioned as “mirrors and ambassadors of European significance”, but also form-oriented, intended to link heritage professionals and sites together. It seeks to reveal European narratives already resting in sites, and to forge a shared European narrative through the very act of labelling. Such ambitious cultural political undertakings require collaboration, and this is where vagueness becomes of essence. To make the action meaningful, independent experts and heritage professionals must be recruited and encouraged to think Europe, to interpret concepts like “European significance” and fill them with content. According to Cris Shore and Susan Wright, it is by applying such soft pressure that cultural policies can “influence people’s indigenous norms of conduct so that they themselves contribute, not necessarily consciously, to a government’s model of social order”.

Returning to the café in Zagreb, the difficulty experienced by the Croatian representatives can be viewed as a response to this strategy of vagueness. They had been asked to think Europe: to consider what kind of “Europe” it was that the EU wanted them to want.

*Extending backwards: Borders in time*

When presented by the European Commission or the EHL panel, the 38 heritage sites that have been awarded the EHL so far are usually listed chronologically, to “convey a sense of history”. Based on the order in which they appear, 13 sites predate the modern era (before 1789), 16 sites date from that time until the end of WWII, and eight sites to the contemporary era (post 1945). The heavy focus on the last centuries, and the leaps in time further back, could be perceived as a natural outcome of the teleological perspective of the label, to mark “milestones in the creation of today’s Europe”. Then, the only conundrum would be why there are only six sites that directly relate to the political history of the EU (e.g. the European District of Strasbourg, the village of Schengen, and the Maastricht Treaty). However, based on statements made by members of the EHL expert panel and my conversations with EU officials, there is an underlying ambition to create an unbiased and representative

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31 EHL 2017, p. 5.
32 EU 2018.
timeline of European history – a hope that “the gaps will be filled gradually”.33 This nurturing of a desire for representativity, in combination with an ambition to create a meaningful past for the Europe of the EU, is a great example of the conflation of history and heritage:

In domesticating the past we enlist it for present causes. Legends of origin and endurance, of victory or calamity, project the present back, the past forward; they align us with forebears whose virtues we share and whose vices we shun. We are apt to call such communion history, but it is actually heritage. The distinction is vital. History explores and explains pasts grown ever more opaque over time; heritage clarifies pasts so as to infuse them with present purposes.34

The line David Lowenthal draws here between history and heritage is rarely so sharp, but it helps make the point that all historical sites are vertical. They are linked to different purposes, peoples, and events in different periods, all of which figure into their history. In the process of becoming heritage, some of these pasts are tilted horizontally, chosen as particularly meaningful against the backdrop of present concerns. The EHL attempts to perform such a tilt through the exercise of listing, an act which also draws up borders in time. To explore when Europe was in this scheme, I return to Krapina and Sagres.

During my visit to the Krapina Neanderthal Museum in 2017, the manager told me be about a recent EHL networking meeting he had attended. Introducing the Krapina site to the other site representatives, he had been asked by some of them why it carried the label, insinuating that the period and topic made Krapina an oddball in the context. I admitted that, confronted with the EHL criteria, I too had been surprised that it included ancient archaeological sites and a Neanderthal site. When first reading about it I remember thinking: surely, they cannot mean that the Europe of the EU has its roots in the Pleistocene? As it turns out, this was not the case. Among the themes outlined by the European Commission and the EHL panel, the site sorts under “quest for knowledge” and “the Europe of science and progress”.35 The panel recommended it for inscription as “a monument to Europe’s contribution to the research on the genesis of humankind”.36

33 EHL 2016, p. 41.
36 EHL 2015, p. 6.
Thus, it is not the Neanderthals but the *academic* importance of the find – including over 900 bone fragments from about 80 individuals – that takes centre stage at Krapina. Its European significance is linked to the discovery in 1899 by geologist and palaeontologist Dragutin Gorjanović-Kramberger (1856–1936), and the subsequent formation of scientific networks and theories around the finds. Out of a 125,000-year history, it was the events of 1899 and their outcomes that were tilted horizontally, chosen as a European past, populated by the great men of Western science. This aligns with the focus of the application, which only drew on the prehistory of the site under the category “common values that underpin European integration”. There it is suggested that the human development theme itself could send a bioenvironmental message of tolerance and peaceful cohabitation rooted in European prehistory. A Croatian heritage professional involved in writing the text told me that this storyline, about the life and culture of the “first Europeans”, had been more pronounced in the initial pitch, but that emphasis had shifted in response to feedback during the EHL application process. In a way, even if anachronistic, connecting the question of what it means to be European to the life of the Neanderthals, and from there to what it
means to be human (Fig. 2), represents a wider approach to Europe than the idea of progress, which is so deeply ingrained in the trope of European civilization.

At Sagres Fortress in Portugal, the heritage professionals in charge had much confidence in the site’s suitability for the EHL. Its European significance is so manifest, they explained, that the real challenge is how to ensure that the story of Prince Henry the Navigator (Infante D. Henrique of Portugal, 1394–1460) does not overshadow the longue durée of the area, which include prehistoric megalithic menhirs, influences from Christian Mozarabs (8th–11th century), and traces of 16–18th-century military history. Indeed, Sagres plays a strong mythical role in the Portuguese historical imagination, both as Henry’s last residence, and the place for his alleged school of navigation (an idea which endures despite being refuted).\textsuperscript{37} Together with the neighbouring town of Lagos, Sagres also figures as a starting point for grand narratives of European exploration. As the EHL panels’ recommendation shows, everything that came before the 15th century is therefore easily baked into the chosen European past:

Sagres Promontory is a rich cultural landscape testifying to the remote origins of European civilisation and its universal expansion in the Age of Discoveries through science, commerce, and exploration.\textsuperscript{38}

While nothing in the application discouraged a focus on Prince Henry, portrayed as a pioneer of globalization and one of the founding fathers of Europe,\textsuperscript{39} it mentions one important aspect which is missing from the EU promotional texts. Henry was also a founding father of the European slave trade.\textsuperscript{40} His “exploration” campaigns were fuelled by greed and religious fanaticism rather than curiosity. Highest on the list of desirable commodities were gold and spices, but in 1444 Henry authorized a fleet which brought back 235 persons from sub-Saharan Africa to be sold as slaves in the city of Lagos, near Sagres. The public auction, which Henry turned into a display of Portugal’s new power as a slave-trading nation, marked the start of two centuries of Portuguese domination in the Atlantic slave trade.\textsuperscript{41} Part of what made these actions seem justifiable at the time was the holy war against Islam. Henry was the grand master of the military Order of Christ, an association funded by the Knights Templar, and when the slave trade began it was Muslim Berber tribes living north

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\textsuperscript{37} Russell 2001.  \\
\textsuperscript{38} EHL 2015, p. 8.  \\
\textsuperscript{39} See also Gonçalves et al. 2016.  \\
\textsuperscript{40} Russell 2001, pp. 260–261.  \\
\textsuperscript{41} Rawley & Behrendt 2005, pp. 18–21; Russell 2001, p. 241. 
\end{flushleft}
of the Senegal River that were the first targets.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the terms “commerce” and “exploration” on the EU sign (Fig. 3) could easily be exchanged for “exploitation” and “subjugation”. In fact, there are historical sources that point to the profits from the slave trade being the reason why Henry could continue his expeditions in the name of science, profit, and the Christian god.\textsuperscript{43}

Grouped under European Commission themes like “quest for knowledge” and “networks and exchanges”,\textsuperscript{44} which are both positively charged components of EU rhetoric, the darker side of the chosen European past at Sagres – the oppression

\textsuperscript{43} Rawley & Behrendt 2005, p. 2; Russell 2001.
\textsuperscript{44} EU 2017; EHL 2016, p. 40.
caused by “the expansion of European culture” (Fig. 3) – becomes defused. If celebrated chiefly as a cross-cultural meeting point and place of globalization, the violence of this period comes off as an achievement. Acts which clearly violated the human rights we now consider to be a core European value, become footnotes in a grand narrative of European civilization. Should this past be cherished? Should it be a base for reconciliation? Should it be used as a means to highlight and criticize power imbalances still in existence? None of these are mutually exclusive, but as it stands, if stories such as that of “Henry the Slave Trader” (Fig. 4) is not processed as part of what it means to be European, the EHL risks sanctioning the crimes of European colonization, trafficking, and religious war.

Looking at the borders in time drawn up at Krapina and Sagres, as well as in the EHL initiative as a whole, there is little to indicate that the scheme – in its mission to create a sense of belonging to the EU – seeks to challenge already established notions of Europe. Even if done with a critical twist, it tends toward reciting a canon where European civilization has its cradle in the Greco-Roman world, youth in the ages of
Discovery, Enlightenment and Empire, adulthood in the Industrial Revolution and World Wars, and maturity in the unification of Europe. This narrative is also circumscribed by the fact that the EHL scheme is only open to EU member states, excluding nations that have played a major part in the history of the region, such as Switzerland, Norway and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, if really aiming for a cultural historical (not geographical) idea of Europe, sites of “European significance” could be found in all parts of the world. Used as an answer to the question of what it means to be European, this limited approach may reinforce a notion of belonging dependent on the past – on where you come from. It could also work to dissociate negative sides of European history from the Europe of the EU. In reality, to be European is of course not the same as being a force of good. Contemporary history, more so than heritage, teaches us that.

**Extending outwards:**

**Heritage at the fault lines of Europe**

Walking along the Sagres promontory I encountered a building with very little signage (Fig. 5). In the maps of the site it is only marked as “naval radio station”. Searching for more information, I found that the first lighthouse at Sagres was inaugurated in 1894, as part of the 5th centenary of the birth of Prince Henry. It was replaced with a new building in 1923, which in turn was to be demolished some 35 years later, because it was considered damaging to the authenticity of what was on the way to becoming a “proper” heritage site. Due to its strategic vantage point a lighthouse was nevertheless needed and on 1 April 1960 a new, architectonically unobtrusive tower was inaugurated as part of the 5th centenary of the death of Prince Henry.45

It was this anonymous building I had seen. Today it forms part of the heritage protection zone of Sagres Fortress, while still in full operation.46 No longer just a navigation aid, it is used for remote-controlled radio-goniometric positioning of un/authorized vessels. Discussing the site’s contemporary meaning with the site co-ordinator, it became clear that it is linked to European and global border surveillance systems, which have recently been tightened in response to boat migration. Just as in the 15th–18th century, the site now has a military function. And just as then, it represents the frontier between Europe and Africa – between the Christian and the Muslim world. Exclusionary political groups in Portugal and Spain reinforce this divide, the co-ordinator said. The sad irony of the situation – that people from the same sub-

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45 Direcção de Faróis 2006, p. 35.
46 DGPC 2018.
Saharan regions from where people were once forcibly taken and brought to Europe by ship and often perished on the way, now risked their lives at sea to get to Europe, often only to be detained or sent back – was not lost on either of us.

Sagres Fortress illustrates how heritage can be tied to both border-transcending and border-confirming practices, at the same time. As part of the EHL scheme, the site participates in the symbolic and networked debordering of the EU, an act of political consolidation and transcension which, due to the conditions created by EU cultural policy, also confirms a meaningful difference between that European and that non-European. This development began in earnest after the Schengen Agreement came into effect in 1995, followed by the launch of the Euro currency in 1999 and the eastward enlargement in 2004. As border-transcending measures in communication, commerce, and education multiplied, researchers began to understand the new Europe as a network of deterritorialized relationships between peoples, places,
and goods: as nodes tied to an EU cluster in an increasingly globalized, technology-driven world.\textsuperscript{48} Still, borders did not vanish as much as they shifted in nature.

This is where the naval radio station becomes important. As part of supranational surveillance networks, it is linked to the (re)bordering of Europe, a complex architecture of control designed to maintain a division between the Europe of the EU and non-Europe.\textsuperscript{49} Fuelled by the War on Terror and illegal immigration, nowadays dangerously conflated, the gaze of EU’s external border regime has increasingly been directed outwards.\textsuperscript{50} Through tools such as Frontex (The European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and its Rapid border intervention teams (RABIT), much of EU’s border-work now takes place at sea or in adjacent countries. Southern and Eastern European states have come to act as buffer zones, enforcing EU borders without membership status in exchange for greater access to EU privileges.\textsuperscript{51} Bilateral agreements have also been struck with Morocco and Turkey (among others) to deter unwanteds from reaching EU borders, and if they do, to return them to the transit country.\textsuperscript{52} For those deported or blocked before reaching the EU, and those waiting in holding centres on Lesbos (Greece) or in Melilla (Spain), “Fortress Europe” is very real. Such in-between places, Étienne Balibar argues, where “foreigners become noncitizens and pariahs”, exposes the border as a “nondemocratic condition of democracy”.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, even if people successfully enter the EU, they soon learn that without the benefit of religious and bodily invisibility, the border travels with them. Because just as borders have extended outwards, they have – “sometimes noisily and sometimes sneakily” – moved from the edges to “the middle of political space”.\textsuperscript{54}

A group deeply invested in upholding such borders is the populist radical right. Taking advantage of the political indecisiveness that has plagued the EU refugee reception crisis, they have managed to build a strong platform for their core issue: to halt non-western (specifically Muslim) immigration. More effective than their policies are their ability to instil fear into public discourse, prompting establishment parties to focus the political conversation on national security.\textsuperscript{55} The fights over refugee quotas in the European Parliament speaks to this influence, exposing Europe as “a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{48} Castells 2000; Sassen 2006.
\bibitem{49} van Houtum 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2015.
\bibitem{50} Follis 2017; Vaughan-Williams 2008; Zaiotti 2016.
\bibitem{51} Liikanen \textit{et al.} 2016.
\bibitem{52} Yıldız 2016.
\bibitem{53} Balibar 2004, p. 111.
\bibitem{54} Balibar 2004, p. 109.
\bibitem{55} Niklasson & Hølleland 2018; Wodak 2015.
\end{thebibliography}
coalition of selfishness rivalling for the trophy of xenophobia”.  One oft-neglected aspect of radical right ideology is that, while anti-EU, they rarely take issue with “Europe” or with co-operation between independent European states. In fact, over the last decade they have established a shared foreign-political message: “Europe for the Europeans”. At its base rests a canonized idea of European civilization which does not differ significantly from the one often cited in EU rhetoric. For them, Cas Mudde argues, Europe is a “meta-culture”, an extended club of distinct nations with roots in Greco-Roman and Christian traditions. Similarly, Rogers Brubaker suggests that the synchronized turn against “Muslims” as a collective enemy has produced a “civilizational overlay of nationalist rhetoric”. That among populist right parties in Western Europe, Christianity, paradoxically, is becoming the new “matrix of liberalism, secularity, and gender equality”. And so...

... even as the European project falters – with the eurozone, Schengen, and the EU itself in deep crisis – a European identity, defined in religio-civilizational terms, has come to figure more centrally in political rhetoric.

Here, the border-transcending and border-confirming practices of the EU traverses the agenda of the radical right. Trying to proactively manage, rather than block Middle Eastern and North African immigration, the externalization of EU’s border regime still aligns with and legitimizes a “politics of fear”. Meanwhile, the radical right’s appeals to protect European civilization makes them rival claimants of a common European heritage. From France to Austria, identitarian youth movements claim to fight for a “genuine Europe”, justifying the harassment of immigrants by alluding to the diverse yet interconnected heritage of “native Europeans”. In Greece, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn rallies against immigrants beneath the Athenian Acropolis (an EHL site since 2014), and holds annual commemorations of the Spartans’ mythologized battle for Western civilization against the Persians at Thermopylae.

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56 Balibar 2015.
58 Liang 2007, p. 29.
60 Brubaker 2017, p. 1211.
61 Brubaker 2017, p. 1211.
62 Brubaker 2017, p. 1212.
63 Wodak 2015.
65 Fielitz 2016; Tharoor 2016.
burning question for the future of EU cultural policy becomes: how can it ensure that the image of European civilization summoned through heritage initiatives like the EHL is fundamentally different from that of the radical right?

Europe ends here? Re-imagining the nexus of heritage and borders

This chapter set off from the premise that heritage forms one of the conditions that makes borders possible. The act of “doing” European heritage can therefore influence, not just people’s sense of belonging to the EU – as is the explicit goal of the EHL – but outline what it “takes” to belong in Europe. The text has raised the simple but critical point, that if the European Heritage Label manages to break borders and expand historical consciousness in the EU, it will also, inevitably, create borders elsewhere. It is vital to be aware of what those borders are and who they serve, lest EU heritage actions risk inadvertently underpinning civilizational agendas that promote ethno-cultural origins as a condition for citizenship and equal treatment. Of course, this is not just a task for EU policy makers. Borders are collaborative projects, and it is up to heritage practitioners, researchers, civil servants, and politicians alike, to be observant of the borders they make and break through their actions.

So how can the points and pitfalls identified in relation to the EHL scheme help us reimagine the traditional nexus of heritage and borders? And how can this nexus be put to work analytically, as something used to “think with” rather than something that preconditions our thoughts about who belongs where? By temporarily reversing the EHL slogan “Europe begins here!” to “Europe ends here”, I will highlight three potential dimensions of a more deliberate approach to heritage and borders.

The first is to locate the political borders within heritage. This means to identify the mechanisms by which the unruly mass of history is tidied up and turned into heritage, whereby particular pasts are singled out for their ability to explain and sanction political status quo. In relation to the EHL, I argued that the conflation of cultural Europe and political Europe, of European history and the heritage of the EU, work as such a mechanism. It allows the EU to tie previous “Europe” to their history as an institution and to their reason for being, with the consequence that the borders which defined what it meant to belong in Europe back then will have bearing on what it means to be European today. To locate such political borders in heritage is the first step if we are to think with them. In the case of the EU this could facilitate a shift from European heritage to heritage in Europe, or better yet, the removal of “Europe” from the set phrase altogether. Recently there are signs of such a trend, as the European Commission has begun to recognize the cultural contributions of everyone liv-
ing in the EU as part of European culture – not just EU citizens. The EU ministers of culture have also flagged for an understanding of cultural heritage as something “constantly evolving” and begun to pay less attention to Europe as signifier. For the EHL this would mean supporting heritage for its knowledge potential first, not as part of an identity-political mission.

The second is to adopt a view from the border. By figuratively climbing borders we locate – between nations and continents, between past and present, between us and them – we can better understand the power asymmetry rooted in the question: Where do you belong? My linking of the border-transcending and border-confirming practices of the EHL to the externalization of EU’s border regime, and to its unintentional alignment with the rhetoric of the European radical right, was an attempt to begin such a climb. To show that just as with the nation state, the rhetoric of European values – of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law – becomes most challenging, even contradictory, along its edges. For EU cultural policy, to adopt such a view would mean to challenge the borders between Europe and non-Europe, as they manifest in big cities, by the sea, or in zones at the EU margins. The EHL could then highlight the ironies and inconsistencies of the grand narratives of Europe, thereby complicating, not harmonizing, current understandings of what it means to be European.

The third is to stop treating heritage as a goodwill project. This means to not, at the outset, draw a border between positive and negative pasts based on how well they match the contemporary values of a given political power, but to recognize the two-faced nature of heritage: that perpetrators and heroes, failures and achievements, are often one and the same. It would signal a more confident and brave stance on heritage, open to embarrassing and self-exposing narratives that challenge the status quo. Discussing the EHL sites assigned European value, I argued that the EU’s implicit belief in both “Europe” and “heritage” as good causes has led to a situation where sites that align with the self-image of the EU are celebrated as part of its own legacy, while sites dealing with uncomfortable pasts are linked to a previous, different Europe, in need of remembrance. The question then, is what would a non-goodwill EHL site look like?

Addressing the aftermath of the Balkan War (1994–1996), Étienne Balibar argued that only if the European Community recognized what transpired as a product of their own history and making – not a mere by-product of communism or an

66 Calligaro 2013.
68 Niklasson 2016, p. 66.
“exterior obstacle to be overcome through exterior means” – would Europe “become possible again”. A future, self-exposing EHL site, situated in one of the external buffer zones of the EU, would therefore be Srebrenica Genocide Memorial. The EHL plaque would then acknowledge the damage caused by the inaction of the EU member states in that conflict. Another suggested future candidate, standing as a monument to EU border politics, is Moria refugee camp and holding centre on the Greek island of Lesbos. In neither case would their European significance be about reconciliation or overcoming obstacles on the way to peace and progress, but about working with pasts that fester on the road to social justice.

References

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